The aim of this paper is to examine the impact on bank stock prices of the Asian and Russian financial crises for a sample of European banks. This issue is of importance regarding financial fragility and contagion effects within the banking industry. We develop an event study methodology based on a large number of macroeconomic news and on public announcements of individual bank exposure during the sharpest episodes in 1997 and in 1998.
Introduction
The two episodes of the Asian and Russian financial crises in the late 1990s led to a severe decline in stock prices on international capital markets. In Europe, bank stocks suffered from sharper fluctuations than average market indexes. In this context, the growing involvement of European banks in East Asian countries and in Russia during the late 1990s raises the issue of financial stability and contagion effects within the banking industry. This is important since the contagion hypothesis, if confirmed, has policy implications regarding the design of the safety net in response to financial crises.
Beside Japanese banks, European banks expanded their activity in East Asian countries and they are extremely involved in Russia. For European banks, the share of loans in percentage of total international lending to Asian countries, increased from 51.9% in December 1994 to 58.1% in June 1997 (BIS (1996 ). In Russia, loans from European banks represented 88.9% of the total amount of international bank lending in December 1997 (BIS (1997 (BIS ( ), (1998 )). A major concern was the extent to which European banks were actually exposed and suffered from the collapse in financial markets, debt defaults and exchange rate movements. European bank lending was led in Asia by German banks, followed by UK and French banks and in Russia by German banks, Swiss banks and to a lesser extent by French, Dutch, Austrian and Italian banks. At the end of 1996, the exposure of UK banks in Asia was mostly spread among three countries -South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan -and to a lesser extent Indonesia and Malaysia. Similarly to UK banks, French and German bank lending was also concentrated on South Korea and Thailand involving Indonesia as well (BIS (1997); 1998(b) ). Before the crisis (end of 1996), German and UK banks reduced their exposures in South Korea and Thailand whereas French banks increased their loans in each of the five countries in which they were already involved. At the end of June 1997, German, French and UK banks had their strongest exposures in South Korea. For German and French banks, exposures were also notably high in Thailand.
The goal of this paper is to measure how news about macroeconomic difficulties and the deteriorating quality of bank portfolios due to country specific exposures affected the stock prices of European banks during these two episodes of financial crisis. We conduct an event study to analyse the pattern followed by individual bank stock returns for the largest possible sample of European banks. More specifically, our aim is to draw policy recommendations regarding the contagion hypothesis that is to assess whether non exposed banks need to be protected, along with exposed banks, under such circumstances.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the link with the existing literature on the reaction of bank stock prices to financial crises. Section 3 describes the data and the choice of events enabling us to carry out an event study. Section 4 analyses the reaction of European bank stock prices to bank specific announcements and to general events of the Asian and Russian crises. Section 5 extends the empirical investigation to capture possible contagion effects and section 6 concludes.
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Related literature
The existing literature on the reaction of bank stock prices to financial crises is mainly dedicated to US banks. A large number of studies investigated the effect of announcements and news on stock returns by following an event-study methodology raising the issue of market efficiency and hence the speed and accuracy of the adjustment of stock prices to new public information. Event studies focusing on the presence of significant abnormal returns for US banks predominantly addressed the issue of the international debt crisis of the 80's or the Latin America currency crises of the 1990s (Cornell and Shapiro (1986) , Mathur and Sundaram (1997) , Kilic, Tufte and Hassan (1999) , Bessler and Nohel (2000) ). An important question raised in most papers is relative to the presence of contagion effects adversely affecting banks with low risk exposures as well as highly exposed banks. These contagion effects are of particular interest for banking institutions because of the central role played by banks and other financial intermediaries in systemic risk.
Amazingly, while banks have often been considered as being at the heart of the Asian and Russian financial crises, to our knowledge, only few exceptions focused on EU banks (Kho and Stulz (2000) and Rime (2003) ). Examining the impact of the Asian crisis on bank stock indexes for both Western (US, France, Germany and the UK) and East Asian countries (Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand), Kho and Stulz (2000) report no significant abnormal returns for Western banks. Regarding the Russian financial crisis, Rime (2003) performed an event study for Swiss banks showing that stock returns were negatively affected by some of the most reported events with mixed evidence about contagion effects. Nevertheless, his results support the hypothesis that investors essentially discriminated among banks on the basis of broad categories (domesticallyoriented/internationally-oriented). In this paper, we focus on the reaction of European banks to both the Asian and the Russian financial crises by conducting an event study applied to individual bank stock data instead of bank stock indexes. We also take into account a large number of macroeconomic events but also bank specific events to capture possible contagion effects by estimating a multivariate model. During the Asian and Russian crises, a large number of macroeconomic events affected the Asian and Russian financial markets. In this study we limited our choice to the most significant dates and periods reported in most studies (BIS (1998 (a) ), BIS (1999), Kho and Stulz (2000) and King (2001) ). We also considered announcements by European banks, which occurred within the crisis period, on their degree of exposure and the directly linked profit warnings. This information comes from Reuters' archives. In this sense we were able to gather both general macroeconomic announcements dates and individual bank specific announcement dates (see Table 1 ). Number of studies employed this procedure to analyze the reaction of US bank stocks to either international debt crises or currency crises (Cornett and Tehranian (1990) , Madura et al. (1992) , Unal et al. (1993) , Mathur and Sundaram (1997) and Lau and McInish (2003) 
Data set and description of the events
where R i,t is either the rate of return on the stock of bank i on day t (for estimations based on individual data) or the rate of return on the bank stock index of country i on day t (for estimations based on industry data); R M,t is the return of the national market index; R EUBANK,t is the return of the European bank stock index provided by Datastream International.
hal-00918567, version 1 -13 Dec 2013 variable D j,t taking the value of 1 the event day and the day after 2 and 0 elsewhere. The coefficient δ i,j of the dummy variable D j,t captures the effect of event j for bank i or for the banking index of country i. Abnormal returns are captured by the statistical significance of the related coefficients. A negative and significant sign is expected when the market anticipates a negative impact of the considered event for bank i. Therefore, we only focus on negative reactions. Because we simultaneously include the dummies related to the Asian and Russian events, the system of equations (1) is estimated from January 1 1996 to December 31 1998 3 .
Industry level and individual bank results
Before considering our sample of individual banks, we first conduct our event study at the 
Market reaction and bank exposure announcements
In order to determine which factors can explain the probability for a bank to be affected by a negative market reaction during the two crises, and also to test for the presence of contagion effects, we first provide descriptive statistics on the relationship between market reactions and bank exposure announcements. We then further analyse this relationship with logit estimations 6 .
Two types of binary variables are computed related to market reactions and bank exposure announcements.
Firstly, building on the results obtained in the previous section, we computed for the Russian crisis event binary variables, which take for bank i the value of 1 when a significant market reaction (at the 5% level) is obtained in our estimations and 0 otherwise. We deliberately ignored all the events for which we obtain too few observations which take the value of 1, that is all the events related to the Asian crisis. We also defined a binary variable named RUSSIATOT i , which takes for bank i the value of 1 when a significant reaction of the market is obtained at least one time out of the different events j (at the 5% level) and 0 otherwise. Eventually, we also built a binary variable, named M_RTOT i reflecting a significant reaction of the market for bank i at least one time out of the three macroeconomic announcements events of the Russian crisis and 0 otherwise.
Secondly, since bank country exposures are not reported in Bankscope, we used information provided by Reuters' archives and annual bank reports to define two sets of binary variables: (i) a variable D_expo, which takes the value of 1 when a bank publicly announced its degree of exposure during the crisis period and 0 otherwise; (ii) for each event j, a variable, D_expobeforej, which takes the value of 1 when a bank publicly revealed its degree of exposure before event j and 0 otherwise.
In our sample, out of the 12 banks which publicly revealed their exposure in Russia 7 , 10 exhibited a significant reaction (2 French banks, 2 German banks, 2 Dutch banks, 1 Swiss bank, 1 British bank and 2 Austrian banks). Among these 12 banks, the market significantly reacted, at least once, for 9 banks which had announced their degree of exposure before the event date. Conversely, the market also significantly reacted at least once during the Russian crisis for 60 banks which had not announced their exposures suggesting the presence of contagion effects. We also examine for each bank the distribution of significant market reactions and its relationship with individual bank exposure. Since, in our sample, the maximum number of abnormal returns for each bank is limited to 4, we define 4 reaction classes all regarding the Russian crisis: (i) no reaction: banks which never exhibit abnormal returns during the Russian crisis; (ii) low reaction: only 1 significant reaction; (iii) intermediate reaction: 2 significant reactions; (iv) high reaction: at least 3 significant reactions. As shown in Table 5 , out of the 109 banks of our sample, 39 never exhibit significant abnormal returns whereas the market frequently reacted for 12 banks of which only 3 had announced their exposures.
The event binary variables were then regressed (logit estimation) on each exposure proxy. We follow here the methodology proposed by Cornel and Shapiro (1986) and Unal et al. (1993) to test the contagion hypothesis. Whereas these authors examine contagion by regressing (OLS estimations) abnormal returns on actual loan exposure, we here use the binary variables D_expo and D_expobejorej in a Logit setting because information on actual individual exposure is not available for a large number of banks in our sample. The results, presented in Table 6 , show that the coefficient of D_expo is never significant. This absence of positive and significant coefficient of the independant variables is consistent with the contagion effect hypothesis. Higher exposure which is publicly announced does not significantly contribute to explain negative abnormal returns and banks with a low exposure suffered from significant falls in stock prices as well as highly exposed banks.
However, the variable D_expobeforej is significant at the 1% level for 5 events out of 8. For 4 of these events the coefficients are negative and highly significant. Consequently, exposure announcements before an event tend to reduce the probability for bank stocks to exhibit abnormal returns suggesting that the market had already integrated the news, good or bad, before the event date (a finding which supports the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis).
Therefore, when banks reveal their exposures before a given event actually occurs or before a crisis is publicly announced, market participants might well be lenient with these banks but "punish" the other banks. Contagion effects might in this case be limited to the subset of non announcing banks.
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Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to examine the reaction of European bank stock prices to events of the Asian and Russian financial crises. Based on a sample of 109 listed banks and a set of macroeconomic announcements and individual bank public announcements, our study first shows that whereas bank stock prices did not react to the Asian crisis, they exhibited significant abnormal returns in response to several events of the Russian Crisis. Using bank public announcements to proxy country exposures of loan portfolios, we find a strong link between bank stock reaction and bank individual news. However, bank stocks are also sensitive to news specific to other banks suggesting evidence of possible contagion effects.
